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The Pedagogy of Community: Trust and
Responsibility at CUNY Law School*
John M. Farago**
John Farago is a founding member of the CUNY Law School
faculty, having served as associate dean and now as a professor.
He has also taught and administered at Valparaiso University
School of Law. His primary teaching and scholarly interests are
jurisprudence and professional responsibility.
All legal education proceeds from implicit premises. This essay
seeks to make ours at CUNY explicit.
The premises of most contemporary law schools (institutions
spawned by the Case Method and reared by Legal Realism) implicitly
seem to value instrumentalism (the notion that lawyers' work consists
in getting the job done, using the existing system to achieve the ends
our clients desire), pragmatism (the notion that the lawyers' profes-
sional task takes place in a universe of moral values over which the
individual attorney has virtually no control and to which she or he
should therefore be resigned), and relativism (the notion that questions
of principle are internal, that they are personal tastes rather than col-
lective and communal judgments).
* The following essay draws heavily on a range of materials drafted over the last
several years. Much of it remains aspirational as we continue to develop this new
institution. It is meant to be an interpretation - part metaphor and part theory - of
the work we have been doing and the goals we have been trying to achieve. In the text
I describe these as collective goals, and I believe them to be such. But one of the things
that we continue to work on is the articulation of our otherwise inchoate shared
premises. To the extent that I seek to make those implicit premises explicit in this
essay, the effort is my own and the execution is shaky at best. The distinction is tricky;
this essay is in many senses an individiual interpretation of collective premises. If that
distinction seems intuitively obvious to you, much of this essay will probably seem
belabored.
** This essay, which is about the ideas that seem to me to lie at the heart of my
work and my life, is dedicated to the memory of my father (Ladislas Farago) and to
the prospect of my children (Max and Sarah and Belle), whose exuberance and sense
of the possible continually expand the boundaries of my life. And to Jeanne Martin;
beneath her cynical exterior there lies a universe of vision and of wonder.
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The implicit premises at CUNY are different, however. We want
to teach our students, to the extent that we can teach them at all, that
the acid of cynicism gradually eats away at one's own soul unless there
is also the balm of idealism. To lawyer well means, for us, to retain
sight of a vision of the good that transcends personal preference or
taste." Values are not immutable outcrops on the moral landscape; they
are choices we make, the specific paths we choose to traverse and cre-
ate as we travel unceasingly through that terrain.
This seeming paradox - that values can simultaneously be some-
thing more durable than individual preference while nevertheless being
a function of personal choice - is one of the major obstacles to. creat-
ing an institution based on shared norms. What does it mean collec-
tively to choose a set of premises, and is this any less relativistic than
choosing such a set individually? But if we choose these premises, how
can they transcend the notion of choice? In fact, this is no paradox at
all, but a function of the definition of morality and the imperfection of
our own intellectual tools.2
1. Of course, to do so with humility requires an awareness that others' views of
the good may differ from ours. In that sense, it is possible to believe that one's own
views are correct without denying others the possibility of believing the same about
their own, conflicting, values. This distinction mirrors in some important ways the dif-
ference between the economic notions of contract and gift set out by my friend and
colleague Dinesh Khosla elsewhere in this Symposium. Contract does not merely cap-
ture my respect for you and your values, it says that I believe them to be as good as my
own. But it seems inherent in the notion of having values that I don't honestly believe
that; what I really believe is that my values are the best ones and all that I am doing
when I say that mine are no better than yours is deferring to my own inability to prove
their superiority. In effect, I yield my heart to my head, my theology to my pragma-
tism, I give dispositive weight to the power of reason when I say that because I can't
prove the primacy of my values I must therefore somehow undercut my belief in them.
I can, however, also respect your values, while believing you to be wrong. Indeed,
the notion of gift seems to me to require that sort of respect. When I give something to
you out of care and community and love, even when I think you are wrong, I do so
fully respecting who you are and what you believe. This approach has a greater ring of
honesty because it does not deny the fact that I believe you to be wrong. Moreover, it
has a greater congruence with my own beliefs because it does not require that I subju-
gate them in order to respect yours.
2. The relation between morality and personal choice is a difficult problem not
well captured by the fuzziness of the language we use to discuss moral issues. I try to
sort some of this language out in Farago, My Rights and Your Responsibilities, in
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROBLEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (R. Stein and
C. Baca, eds.; 1983) (see especially, Section III, at 16-18). My former colleague Rich-
ard Stith has struggled with a different aspect of this in Stith, The World as Reality,
[Vol. 10
Farago
There are two different things we mean when we use the word"choose". Sometimes we mean the process of making a selection, a
choice among otherwise equally good alternatives whereby we express
our preferences (when we choose sweetbreads over sprouts for dinner,
for instance, because we prefer the way they taste). This is the exercise
of an option or the expression of a preference, and this sort of choice is
relativistic and idiosyncratic. But other times we use the word to mean
that we make a commitment, that what we do is an expression of our
will and not merely an event that happens to us. Choice in this sense is
an expression of our own participation in our lives. This second sort of
choice is internal and personal in the sense that commitment requires
will and is therefore personal,$ but it goes beyond taste to belief and
therefore is something that is no longer relativistic (as would be the
case were I to prefer sprouts to sweetbreads by reason of my principled
vegetarianism).
The confusion arises because we cannot demonstrate the validity
of our personal moral commitments, and so it may appear that the
choice to commit is but a special case of the choice to prefer.4 But to
accept this notion is to undermine the foundation of belief or commit-
ment, to unmake the choice.
As we seek to articulate shared goals, then, we encounter a series
of obstacles each of which may prove insurmountable. First, we must
make our individual commitments, we must identify what we as indi-
viduals believe in. By no means everyone (and especially not all law-
yers) make such a personal commitment to a moral framework, and
part of our faculty appointments process (and student admissions pro-
cess) has involved identifying a group of people whose lives and work
(in remarkably diverse ways) embody such a personal commitment to
values.
Second, though, the very diversity of our community means that,
having made such an initial commitment, we have implicitly (and, to
an increasing extent, explicitly) asked that those of us who are here try
to identify a shared core of commitment while retaining our initial
as Resource, and as Pretense, 20 AM. J. JuRIs. 141 (1975). I fear that both of these
attempts succeed, to the extent they do at all, only by redefining words in ways that
run counter to common usage ("ethics" and "morality" in my article, "values" in Rich-
ard's). I discuss other difficulties created by the weakness of our moral antennae in
Farago, Intractable Cases, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 195, 231-39 (1980).
3. See supra, note 2. See Farago, My Rights and Your Responsibilities, supra
note 3.
4. See Stith, A Critique of Fairness, 16 VAL. U.L. Rnv. 459, n. 15 (1982).
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premises. We try, that is, to articulate a shared vision, to achieve a
moral consensus, even as we recognize the importance of holding on to
one's own principles. Finally, if such a core can be articulated, we ask
ourselves collectively to reassess our individual commitments in light of
our shared premises and to engage in a dialectic between personal and
institutional values.
Each of these obstacles implies a distinctive risk. If we stop before
identifying our own values (or give up along the way), we buy into a
corrosive pragmatism that deprives us of a role in our own moral uni-
verse. If we stop after identifying our own values but give in to our
inability to demonstrate their validity, we may come to view our
choices as mere preferences and to view institutional values as illegiti-
mate, thereby buying into a dizzying relativism.5 If we move beyond
relativism, we are then subject to the potential risks of paternalism,
absolutism, and political dissension. The more we commit to the things
we believe in, the harder it is to retain a sense of humility and an abil-
ity to work together to craft a shared set of premises.6 Finally, if we
manage to generate a set of shared premises without reexamining our
own views in their light, we run the risk that the foundation we have
developed will be forged, rather than crafted, that it will emerge from
compromise rather than consensus, that it is simply a moral deal not an
expression of collective commitment.
More concretely, the hardest task we have faced thus far has been
our need to articulate values that the institution, as an institution, re-
spects. Because these premises go beyond the individual, because they
are institutional as well as personal, our program involves extensive col-
5. See Bloustein, Social Responsibility, Public Policy, and the Law Schools, 55
N.Y.U.L. REV. 385 (1980). This sort of relativism is familiar to those who have studied
moral reasoning as an aspect of human development. Thus, Lawrence Kohlberg's
schema of moral development includes a stage of pre-principled relativism (the stage he
refers to as "4 ") through which some people pass before fully committing to their
own values. L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, 411 (1981).
Relativism becomes a value in its own right, along the lines of the principle of "pru-
dence" that Anthony Kronman identifies at the heart of Alexander Bickel's work.
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
6. The tension between absolutism on the one hand and the desire to fight abso-
lutism absolutely on the other hand is captured with eloquence and beauty in a seg-
ment of Jacob Bronowski's television series, The Ascent of Man (episode, "Knowledge
and Uncertainty"), and is summarized in the chapter of the same title in the book
based on the series. Bronowski's skill as an artist (in the television medium) and his
complexity as a thinker, are reflected in his ability to capture the problem fully without
either resolving the tension at all or becoming stalemated by it.
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laboration and widespread integration. We have an inchoate notion of
what we are trying to do and we struggle daily to find expression for
that notion.
Central to our premises are the twin values of responsibility and
trust. Responsibility seeks to capture what we mean when we think
about being lawyers who serve human needs. We want to help our stu-
dents, as they become lawyers, remain accountable to their own aspira-
tions. We want them to see their own actions as means towards moral
ends of their own definition.
Trust is central to what we do because we come as individuals to
this collective task. That means that we differ in the definition of our
task in ways that range from nuance to centrality. If we differ in defin-
ing institutional agendas, we must work together, respecting each of
our sets of values, while refining the community's ability to articulate
its own. This is a task that requires trust (and perhaps naivete). Absent
trust, laws become mere rules; with trust they can be expressions of
principle.
So, these twin issues - responsibility and trust - keep coming up
for us in all the work that we do. Over the years they have had an
impact on virtually all aspects of our program, including our approach
to the teaching of doctrine, our approach to the teaching of a lawyer's
skills, and our approach to the ways in which we work with each other
to create and define our own community. This essay seeks to provide
something between history and insight about the ways in which we
have sought to deal with these three areas of our work.
A. Doctrinal Teaching - The Role of the Courses
1. Courses, Houses, Simulations
We began planning for the Law School with a notion of bringing
together theory, practice, and doctrine. As a direct collorary, we struc-
tured the program around the seemingly distinct organizations of the
Courses and the Houses. Why?
I see us as having set out to create a Pattern for the law, in order
that our students, walking along it, can become empowered.7 This Pat-
tern is not about content, but about form; it cannot be known, but only
7. The source of this metaphor is, loosely, R. ZELAZNY, NINCE PRINCS IN AM-
BER (1976); see also Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on
the Unspoken Promises of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 475, 484-7 (1978).
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felt, experienced, and embodied; it is the stuff of archetype, not idea.
This is, I think, a qualitatively different sort of thing for a law
school to do. Most schools try to give their students the ability to roam
their own legal universe, a universe that they come to perceive as the
only one. There is a deterministic quality about life in such a legal
universe. The law becomes The Law, and lawyers come to see them-
selves as powerless implementers of its demands. In contrast, I think
that we want our students to travel through all of the parallel legal
universes, and to feel the ways that those alternatives are tied together
and differ from each other." Why? Certainly not for theoretical com-
pleteness, or because I would like to tout any particular one of the al-
ternatives as preferable. It is not any one alternative that is better; it is
the ability to see oneself as able to select, as having an active rather
than a passive role, that makes the qualitative difference. That is what
we mean when we say that we want our students to become responsible
for their actions as lawyers and as people. That is the link between
responsibility and empowerment.
So we want to come up with a Pattern, a path that our students
can walk and, in the walking, through the walking, change themselves,
enliven themselves, charge themselves, empower themselves. This is not
simply a cognitive process, but, of course, cognition is caught up in it.
The difference is that cognition, the cognition that counts, comes only
after understanding, an awareness after understanding that that
(whatever "that" is) is what it is all about. Cognition is reflective
epiphany. It is not simply a physical or affective exercise. It is a con-
scious, a self-conscious, incorporation of understanding. 9
I had a teacher once named Marshall Ho. He was an acupunc-
turist/ physician and a Tai Chi master. He taught Tai Chi when I was
a student at the California Institute of the Arts. And he said that the
two disciplines were essentially one. In fact, he said that going through
the full Tai Chi run of exercises was the equivalent of a complete
acupuncuture once over and rejuvenation. It seems to me that Tai Chi,
or any of the martial arts or physical yogas, is basically what I am
talking about with respect to walking the Pattern. It is an external path
8. I don't mean this simply in the sense of teaching cross-culturally. There are
innumerable alternatives within any one system; we as lawyers are constantly making
choices, for better or worse, about clients, about strategies, about career paths, and
about role and stance.
9. See Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on the Un-
spoken Promises of Our Law, supra note 8, at 492-96.
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inwards, a pattern of physical acts that comes to have a spiritual, a
metaphysical meaning. The moves in Tai Chi are a representation.
They have a cognitive meaning, but they are not only about their physi-
cal form. Over time, going through the physical aspect of the moves
one is encouraged to come to a specific sort of understanding or aware-
ness that is neither physical nor cognitive nor affective, but somehow
involves all three. So we are looking, in this sense, for the yoga of the
law.
That, for me, is what our pedagogy is all about. It defines the need
for the Courses, and the need for the Houses, and the ways in which
the two interact. The Courses provide the intellectual form. They are
the armature, the content of the Pattern, the intellectual substance
that, once one understands, constitutes knowledge. This intellectual
structure is vitally important for us, the designers of the Pattern, be-
cause it in a very real sense is the Pattern.
But it is not the way to walk the Pattern. That is what the Houses
and the simulations (which are designed with care to embody certain
crucial truths - which in turn are not really truths but fundamental
questions - about the law), and by doing so in the company of guides
who can offer support for the students in their quest even if they can't
directly impart the experience, our students can be encouraged to
achieve a responsible sense of their own role.
Thus, our students engage in simulations, the concept of which is
determined by (and to some extent determines) the content of the
Courses and the experience of which is played out through the Houses.
The Courses themselves meet in general as lectures addressed to the
entire class. They constitute about eight hours of student time per
week. In addition, students spend roughly twice that amount of time in
House-based activities structured around the content of the simula-
tions. In House, a student might plan, execute, or reflect on a lawyering
activity, either individually or as a member of a group. The activities
range from intake interviews, through negotiations and drafting exer-
cises, to mediations and appellate arguments. In all of these the student
is encouraged to approach the problem presented by the simulation
with the complexity and multiplicity of dimension with which lawyers
approach each problem they encounter in their work.
For example, a student may be asked to do an intake interview.
The purpose of that interview is to elicit information about the prob-
lem, but it also must give the student the range of data needed to in-
form a judgment about whether or not to accept the client (a judgment
that involves important questions about both professional ethics and the
1986]
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economics of one's practice). It will teach interviewing as a skill, but it
will also raise questions about doctrine (what information do I need in
order to answer the legal question this client presents?), about legal
theory (how many different ways are there to think about the legal
issues here?), about strategy (what does the client want; how can I best
analyze the legal questions to capture the client's own views of what is
important in this matter?), and about professional responsibility (how
does this matter, and my potential role in it, comport with my views of
what should be and how I view my profession?). In addition, it will give
us a chance to work on time management skills and on the importance
of striking a balance between collaborative effort (planning, brain-
storming, and working together) and independence.
The Courses provide a framework for thinking about the issues
raised in the simulations. In the first semester, for example, a problem
raised by a proposed house purchase expresses issues that relate to all
of the substantive Courses - Law in a Market Economy; Liberty,
Equality, Due Process; and Adjudication and Alternatives to Adjudica-
tion - as well as to the course that focuses on the role, responsibility,
and skills of lawyering - the Work of a Lawyer. Faculty in each of
these courses will lecture directly and indirectly about the work being
done in the simulation. The ideas laid out in the Courses provide a
context for inquiry and reflection in the simulations.
Student work in the Houses takes the content of the Courses and
allows students to work with it in the way that lawyers do, reflecting on
it in a way that lawyers seldom have an opportunity to. Faculty in the
Houses - the House Counselors - provide guidance, feedback, and
support and draw students' attention back to the context of inquiry.
Student work is evaluated in the Houses, by the House Counselors, and
not in the Courses. There are six areas of evaluation: Professional Re-
sponsibility, Clinical Judgment, Legal Reasoning, Theoretical Perspec-
tive, Communication, and Management of Effort.
The Houses, then, are simulated offices. But they are more than
that and different from it. The name comes from Ezra Ehrenkrantz,
the architect for the renovation of our permanent facility, who stressed
the importance of creating spaces that students could use to help them
define the school as their community, a resource that is seldom found in
commuter institutions. He proposed a series of small work areas, with
student carrels linked to faculty offices, library materials, and other im-
portant resources and support facilities through an interior corridor.
This basic configuration, which accomodates roughly forty students,
three faculty, and a secretary, is replicated eleven times in our building
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and, in one way or another, draws on all three years of our curriculum.
So the Houses are spaces that define community, and they are ar-
eas in which work gets done. They are part lounge, part homeroom,
part office. The nature of our program involves intensity and vulnera-
bility, ideology and emotion. All of these get played out in the Houses
and contribute to the special character that each develops almost im-
mediately. Because we begin each year with virtually no centralized
rules for House management, the Houses also quickly become individu-
als in the ways in which they approach such issues as smoking, decora-
tion, maintenance of House resources, creature comfort, and courtesy.
Indeed, one of the first things that must be grappled with is the absence
of an imposed decision-making paradigm for House governance. And
this in turn provides the opportunity for reflection on the nature of
rules and rule-making, and the relation between rules and community.
We make significant efforts to model the Houses on work situa-
tions. Student fees pay for copying machines, local telephone services,
microform copying, and so on, allowing us to do away with coinboxes
and many of the distinctions between faculty and student office re-
sources. Even so, the experience of the first year is too intense, the frus-
trations too great, the demand for collaboration too persistent, the push
for reflection and self-scrutiny too relentless to allow them to become
typical office environments.
The Courses, the Houses, and the Simulations, then, are not three
distinct elements of our program. They are all aspects of a Pattern that
we seek to create, each contributing to and influencing the others.
2. The Courses and the Teaching of Doctrine.
The transition from the notion that we are trying to develop an
approach to the teaching of law that conveys something prior to any
single legal system to an understanding of the implications this has for
the teaching of doctrine is either self-evident or impossible. At the
heart of the notion of a Pattern is a sense that there is the teaching of
doctrine and there is the teaching of a relation to doctrine. The two are
tied together; one is impossible without the other. But they are emphat-
ically not the same thing (or at least they are not the same thing from
the perspective of the Pattern, a perspective in which there are alterna-
tives and from which it is possible to choose among competing relations
to doctrine).
If doctrine just is, if it is given and unalterable, then one's relation
to it is tremendously limited. There is an important difference, there-
1986]
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fore, between teaching the substance of the law as an end in itself
("coverage") and teaching it as a means to the end of responsible
lawyering.
Doctrine as a self-validating end mires us in a particular universe.
It reifies some specific variation of the Pattern and makes it real. It
takes us away from viewing things as versions of the Pattern, and con-
vinces us that this is the only world there is. Doctrine as the stuff of
which all possible parallel universes are made, on the other hand, is
precisely what the notion of a Pattern is about.
An anecdote:
The first crisis I had to deal with when I became a law school
administrator had to do with the labor law curriculum of the school I
was teaching at. The faculty member who had taught labor law had
just left to return to practice. He had structured the school's offerings
to include a basic course ("Labor Law"), and a course that, in effect,
picked up on whatever interested him that semester. At most law
schools the second course would have been called something like "Se-
lected Topics in Advanced Labor Law." But he had chosen, primarily
as a marketing technique, to call it "Labor Law II." When he left, we
dropped Labor Law II.
The students went wild. We were depriving them of half of Labor
Law. They would go out into the world ill-prepared for (indeed, totally
ignorant of) half of the material necessary to any labor lawyer. No
amount of explanation could convince them that they had not been
ripped off. We had invented a doctrinal myth and had to accept that it
had taken on a life and a power of its own. We had reified Labor Law
II, and by the connotation of its title convinced our students that they
needed that particular course.
The power that doctrine has for students (and for courts and for
just about everyone other than clients) comes out in a lot of ways. Stu-
dents complain about unpublished course materials, materials, that is,
that are not adequately reified (it amazes me how important it can be
to bind or typeset unpublished materials). Students worry that their
courses haven't covered every topic in the casebook. There are schools
in which even multiple section courses are taught by only one faculty
member, so the content of the course (and by extension of the legal
system) takes on the authority of being The Law, rather than one per-
son's cut at the law.
Whenever we teach doctrine we teach, implicitly or explicitly, a
relation to doctrine. When we teach doctrine as reification, the relation
to it we teach is one of subordination, of idolatry, of weakness and
[Vol. 10
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powerlessness. When we teach doctrine as manifestation, that is, as ar-
bitrary (though not random) response to social needs, we empower our
students by encouraging them to be aware of options, choices,
alternatives.
We cannot, of course, empower someone who doesn't want that
burden. But that does not mean that we should let go. Our job is to
provide support for work that is difficult, not to facilitate the avoidance
of the hard or the painful.
Obviously, the converse is also true: It is impossible to teach a
relation to doctrine without teaching doctrine. Responsibility requires
competence. The point is that competence taught for its own sake can
often provide an alluring substitute for responsibility. Because I am
good at what I do I don't have to think about the "what" of what I do,
or what impact my doing it well has. With competence can come a
false sense of mastery, a mistaken belief that what is done well is well
done. With responsibility comes a feeling of humility, a knowledge that
shooting an arrow requires both the skill to make it land where you
want it to go and an understanding of where the target is.
One more word on "coverage," lest I seem to be arguing that
whatever students happen to pick up will be just fine. I don't mean
that. Of course there is a body of nuts and bolts law that they will be
called upon to know about. But I don't think that we can teach that
sort of doctrine efficiently until after they have incorporated a relation
to doctrine. That is, first people have to become lawyers, which they do
in part by working with doctrine (almost any doctrine, chosen at ran-
dom or by design); then (and only then) can they efficiently learn the
law. That is not news; traditional law school curricula work that way
just as much as ours does. The difference is that we impart a commit-
ment to a different sort of relation to doctrine as our first step, and we
do so explicitly, not by default.10
Once our students become comfortable in relation to doctrine,
there are lots of very efficient ways to learn the substance of the law:
Lectures (live or on tape), outlines, computer adventures, readings,
programmed learning sequences. Students do this all the time. Second
10. Many would say, of course, that traditional first-year courses seek to provide
students with the kind of perspective and conceptual limberness that is inherent in
much of what I say we value at CUNY. The difference, I think, is that we are institu-
tionally conscious of the fact that doing this is value-laden and that we stress to our
students their own responsibility for the choices they make rather than the relativism of
values that makes any choice equally palatable.
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or third-year students who don't come to traditional classes spend
thirty or forty hours reading hornbooks, outlines, and (if they are very
sophisticated) journal articles and do just fine on traditional final ex-
ams. Graduates take bar review courses that teach them in ten hours of
lecture and readings the doctrine that was supposed to be contained in
a three-credit course.
It is possible for a law school to handle coverage in the way that
students instinctively handle it (though we have yet to fully realize this
possibility at CUNY). So I don't think we need to worry about cover-
age as the backbone of the courses. In fact, I think we can't afford to.
Because if we do, then we have adopted the relation to doctrine that
the traditional taxonomy of law embodies implicitly.
This is the reason why we teach Law in a Market Economy,
rather than Contracts and Property and Corporations and Labor Law.
People I talk to about our program often mutter things like, "old wine
in new bottles."11 They assume that we are just engaging in an intellec-
tual reorganization, making one arbitrary and neutral selection from a
library of potential intellectual organizations of a constant body of doc-
trine. Our reorganization may seem slightly more elegant, or more con-
temporary, to us, but in their view it is basically just more of the same
sort of thing.
No. That's not what we are trying to do. We are challenging that
very claim, the claim of asserted neutrality and arbitrariness in making
such choices, and we are asserting that the choice one makes runs in,
under, and through the way one chooses to be a lawyer.
Again, this is not an intellectual, a theoretical, challenge. Our stu-
dents don't need to have this pointed out to them; they need not iden-
tify themselves by comparison (and in opposition) to a "traditional"
approach to lawyering. It is an experiential, visceral, all-encompassing
challenge, the challenge that yoga makes to scientism. Our analysis be-
gins with transactions among people, transactions that lead to legal
forms. Our analysis stands in opposition to any one that begins with
legal forms and imposes those forms on people. And this difference cap-
tures, models, patterns a way of relating to legal doctrine that we be-
lieve is difficult and challenging, but possible and preferable. The shape
of the bottle determines the taste of the wine.
The point is that when we fall back into worrying about coverage
11. I am indebted to my former colleague Alfred W. Meyer of the Valparaiso
faculty for being the first person to make this observation to me shortly after I left
Valpo to come to CUNY.
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we also fall into embracing a relation to doctrine that gives it the upper
hand. The embrace becomes a bear hug that crushes the life from the
law and the people who work within it.
B. Experiential Learning - The Function of the Houses
Our law school program focuses on encouraging our students to
take responsibility for their acts as lawyers. This, in turn, implies a
very specific role for the teaching of doctrine as a way to model a rela-
tion to doctrine that we believe is empowering. It has similar implica-
tions for the ways in which we go about teaching lawyering skills and,
by extension, for the ways in which we work together in the Houses as
well as the Courses.
1. Teaching and Learning
We are teachers; our students are learners. The process whereby
they become responsible lawyers depends on each of us, students and
faculty alike, coming to accept these roles not in a hierarchical but in a
functional sense. If we are to avoid the false hierarchy of traditional
educational roles we must find contexts that respect the legitimate ine-
quality between us. On one level, this means that there must be a rea-
son, a good reason, why the students pay and we get paid. On another,
less cynical, level, there is complimentary legitimacy in our expertise on
the one hand and in their desire to become responsible professionals on
the other. We must seek structures that permit us to evidence that ex-
pertise while honoring and encouraging student responsibility for
learning.' 2
12. There are numerous buzz words in this: "hierarchy," "inequality," "responsi-
bility," "expertise," for example. It is difficult to speak about things that are central to
the Law School's mission without touching on words like these, precisely because the
Law School has a mission. Because we are committed to shared principles, principles
that in some sense transcend our individual analyses and priorities, we find ourselves
continually looking for words that capture those principles. The principles to which we
are committed have to do with a critical analysis of the law, the society, and the role of
lawyers, and so we find ourselves talking about hierarchies and inequalities; struggling
to sort out the legitimate, functional, essential ones from the far more common limit-
ing, demeaning, illegitimate ones. And our principles have to do with the modeling of a
professional role that at its core is about responsibility and choice, so we find ourselves
introspectively concerned with our own choices while we seek ways to encourage stu-
dents to exercise (almost paradoxically) their own choices. The challenge is to find a
way of using these words whereby they retain their freshness. These are words that
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Teaching - our consciously taking responsibility for the substance
that we put out - and learning - our students' coming to take con-
scious responsibility for their own professional growth - are central to
our mission. But there is even more to it than that. In all education this
complimentary balance is desirable; for us it is essential. It is essential
because we are not trying to teach a series of ideas, but rather are
trying to help students become good lawyers. And for us that means
responsible professionals. The taking of responsibility for one's choices
is not simply a matter of educational philosophy for us, it is the very
thing we are trying to capture in the development of our students as
professionals. So it is absolutely essential both that our analyses of the
nature of law take into account lawyers' responsibility for the content
of the law, and that our school provide contexts that permit the expres-
sion of our expertise (teaching, our own taking of responsibility) and of
our students' aspirations and principled desires (learning, their taking
of responsibility).
2. The Houses as a Context for Learning
The Courses provide a context for teaching. They are the way in
which we structure the presentation of material. They are the arma-
tures, the paradigms, the intellectual frameworks whereby we present
the substance of the law according to organizational principles that we
find to be challenging, fertile, accurate, and complexly interdependent.
As teachers, perhaps more importantly as people committed to the im-
portance of ideas and of the development of a critical perspective on
the part of our students, the Courses are in many ways in the center of
our activity. It is through the Courses that we shape the way in which
the content of the law is presented.
The design and teaching of the Courses, then, is the way in which
we take conscious responsibility for the material that we put out. In
capture our central ideas, and so they have a special power for us to evoke the stuff
around which we have joined. It is always tempting to distance ourselves from that
power, either by invoking the words more or less by rote - saying them without listen-
ing to them anymore - or by dismissing them as our own sort of jargon. When we do
so we give in in tiny ways to the centrifugal force that seeks to tear our shared mission
apart and return us to an atomized, individuated approach to teaching. Because I be-
lieve that our success will depend on our ability to retain a sense of shared goals despite
all of the pressure to dissolve back into a group of dedicated, well-intentioned, but
independent individuals, I find myself constantly struggling to hear words like "hierar-
chy," "responsibility," "trust," and "empowerment" with a feeling of freshness..
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doing so, we model a relation to the law - our subject matter - that
is deeply professional. We choose not to erect a (misleading) shield of
objectivity, but rather acknowledge that the way in which we choose to
structure our analysis of the substance of the law (and of its underlying
theory) is just that, a choice.
The Houses, on the other hand, provide a context for learning. It is
in the Houses that we seek to find ways to encourage our students to
take responsibility for their own emergence as professionals. Taking
that sort of responsibility is often hard. It means taking the chance of
associating oneself with the outcomes of one's actions. It means a con-
stant awareness of the consequences of one's actions. And so it is often
more comfortable to sink back into being taught rather than to rise to
the challenge of learning.
For many of our students this will be especially seductive. They
are somewhat older, returning to school, often, from stressful and de-
manding professional roles. Their expectations, based on their earlier
educational experiences, will be that they can relax for three years
while we take the responsibility for their education. This is natural and
appropriate, and it often lies below the surface. Adult students often
assert their independence, their desire to be treated as mature beings,
and yet they simultaneously fail to take such responsibility when it is
available. They seem to want the power that comes with being adult
without the responsibility. Being sensitive to this undertow is central to
our role in the Houses, because it is the function of the Houses to make
the consequences of student failures to act responsibly more immedi-
ately evident, and it is the function of the Houses to provide support
whereby students' taking responsibility is made somewhat less
threatening.
In particular, there are three issues about learning that can be ad-
dressed in the Houses particularly effectively:
i. Responsibility for Learning
The Houses are a context for students coming to learn about what
it is to be a lawyer, and so they are the forum for student work on and
reflection about the content of the Courses. In this way the Courses and
the Houses are linked.
Thus, for example, students seek answers to substantive questions,
as though such answers would provide a complete understanding of
what it means to function as a lawyer in one of another of the simula-
tions we put out. The crucial thing here is not that all House Counsel-
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ors feel a need to have all of the substantive answers at their fingertips.
Rather, it is that we all need to retain a sensitivity to the fact that such
answers, while important, often deflect attention away from learning
about other, riskier lawyering issues.
Similarly, we should be aware that students will come in asking us
to treat them as students rather than co-workers. This can come up in
an almost infinite number of ways, but, in the context of experiential
learning, it is most immediate around substantive legal questions. What
is the law here? Does my client have a case? What should I do? They
want us to answer these questions about their responsibilities to their
clients, and we are tempted to do so. On one level it is fine; it would be
unrealistic and unfair to claim that we have no expertise in these areas.
But on the other, subtler, hand we must be sensitive to the fact that the
form of the questions often makes it difficult for us to transmit that
expertise without simultaneously making it easier for students to avoid
their own responsibility for their choices in the simulated lawyer/client
relationship.
There is reciprocity here. We may find this definition of student
and faculty roles as tempting as the students do. It is familiar. It is also
often functional. It permits us to avoid reflection on our responsibility
at th6 same time as it does the same for the students, since all we seem
to be doing is answering their questions. In this regard, teaching re-
quires us to engage in the same sort of introspection and reflection that
we call on our students to do. The responsibility for one's own learning
is one that teachers and students share.
ii. Evolving the Learning Context
Just as we can collaborate in avoiding student responsibility, we
can also collaborate with students in creating it. The Houses are a con-
text for this as well. They are the way in which students can come to
participate as persons in evolving a context for learning. As the issue of
responsibility for one's choices (whether in the simulations, around
"housekeeping" matters, or with respect to school-wide policy ques-
tions) becomes foreground in our work with students it is inevitable
that their role in forging the context for their own learning becomes
central.
The danger here, I think, is that it is easy to mistake a desire for
power for an openness to accepting responsibility. We all often express
a desire to determine our own participation in the work we do, but it is
much rarer that we are willing to take responsibility for getting it done.
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This is central to the evolution of our students as lawyers, because tak-
ing on the role of a professional in large measure means accepting re-
sponsibility rather than seeking power. The role of the House Coun-
selor here is to maintain the focus on the former, recognizing that the
latter (to the extent that it is legitimate) will emerge from it.
Thus, for example, students often have extra time on their hands
in the Houses, and come to feel restless when they don't have specific
tasks filling the House time. The difficult task for the House Counselor
here, however, lies not in trying to find work for idle hands. Rather, it
lies in finding ways to encourage the students and the House to con-
sider the consequences of that decision-making, and to come to a deci-
sion that is not focused on who has the power to decide, but instead is
focused on what is the best, the most functional and responsible deci-
sion to make from the perspective of students' responsibilities to them-
selves (for their learning), their classmates (for their cooperation), and
their clients. Other decisions, ranging from allocations of House time
within the simulations, through housekeeping tasks such as the reas-
signment of desks, the management of the House Libraries, or the ac-
comodation of smokers' and non-smokers' preferences provide expres-
sions of this sort of learning opportunity, as do governance issues13
(both in-House and school-wide) and quality-of-life questions. The
quality of life in particular raises issues in this regard, because so little
is done to make the Law School a pleasant place to work unless we and
our students individually and collectively take responsibility to make
specific things happen.
The most pressing concerns here often revolve around time man-
agement questions. "Can I miss Tuesday's House session?" "Wednes-
day's lecture?" "Where should I be when?" "Why can't I do this stuff
at home?" "Why isn't there enough time for meetings?" Of course we
have expectations about these sorts of questions, but the way that the
questions get put out can undermine our ability to express those expec-
tations while simultaneously encouraging students to take responsibility
for their own learning. The twin dangers here are that, on the one
hand, we want to yield to the temptation of simply determining the
norms, of telling people where they should be at any given moment, of
minimizing their time management problems because we view them as
casual or less important; while on the other hand we want to yield to
requests for democratic decision making. "I think this, but of course it
13. See infra, section C.
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is up to you."
Substantively, each of these responses is appropriate at different
times and for different people; but the key is that all of these questions
have implications, all of the answers have consequences. We seek to
retain an ability to put those consequences into the spotlight, to fore-
ground the subtext of the questions and of the decision-making process
(and, for that matter, of the decisions themselves).
Encouraging the students' participation in their own learning is a
challenge for us in part because it means remaining alert to the impli-
cations that lie beneath the surface both in student requests that we
make decisions, and in their demands that they be given the power to
be self-determining. It is a challenge also because we may often find it
easier to yield to those requests and demands.
iii. Reflections on Learning
The Houses provide a natural forum for reflection on the learning
that takes place, both in the Courses and in the Houses. It is here that
we reflect on and think about the implications of our choices, and it is
part of the House Counselors' responsibility to encourage such
reflection.
There are somewhat distinct (but clearly related) levels of reflec-
tion. On one hand, it makes sense that we seek to encourage an aware-
ness of the sorts of underlying issues that I have been discussing so far.
That is not a hidden agenda for us as initiates. It is something that we
need to find ways to express and think about things with our students.
Their involvement in an emerging and developing acceptance of respon-
sibility for their own learning requires consciousness of that process. So
we should seek to find ways to make that issue foreground, to step
outside the experiential learning or decision-making tasks that the
Houses will be engaged in, and to view those tasks and processes ana-
lytically on individual, inter-personal, and collective levels.
By extension, there is an important intellectual component of this
sort of reflection. It has much to teach us about individual and social
needs and pressures, and as a result it has much to teach about the
nature of law, of constitutions, and of rule-making. Student responsibil-
ity for learning, and the pressures that lead students and teachers to
forego such responsibility, mean that we are constantly engaged in the
Houses in the sort of community- and governance- building that can
inform at a deeper theoretical level an understanding of the complexi-
ties, tensions, and outcomes of the larger society, including the sources,
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benefits, pitfalls, and essential incompleteness of law as a response to
social needs.
Here again our role is a difficult one, because both sorts of reflec-
tion have to vie for time and attention with the content of student
work. Thus, there is a strong pull away from focusing on this sort of
reflection, because it is difficult to make room for a concern about such
seemingly abstract issues when important substantive issues seem to
cry out for decision. Somewhat more subtly, when it is most difficult
(and most important) for students to take responsibility for their own
learning, they often experience a focus on this sort of reflection as un-
pleasant, irrelevant, and annoying. Our task is to find ways to make the
possibility of such reflection always available, to provide opportunities
that can be taken (by individuals and by the House and the School as a
whole) when people are ready to take them.
Providing continuing support for these three learning issues is a
tall order. It is difficult to maintain the overview necessary to fulfill our
role as teachers in this context, and it is hard to present the issues with
clarity and openness to student involvement. There is a constant pull to
cooperate with our students in giving them what they can get at every
other school, an infantilized role that denies their own responsibility for
their education. Perhaps hardest of all, we often find it difficult to
maintain the patience necessary to allow our students to reach readi-
ness for this role, without automatically providing them with the easy
fallback role of being subjected to our teaching rather than empowered
by their learning.
C. Building Community - Governance and Trust
It must already be evident that we seek almost constantly to oper-
ate on several levels at once.14 In precisely this way, as we try to create
our constantly changing community we try to use that process of crea-
tion as a way to focus on the content we study - society-formation,
rule-formulation, regulation, and the creation of a sense of community
that infuses law with meaning. In part for this reason, and in part be-
14. Howard Lesnick once described our task as trying to get someplace in a ca-
noe that we are in the process of building. That is not simply a description of what it is
to teach a program at the same time that one is inventing it. It will endure for so long
as the program succeeds; it is inherent in the task as we define it. We simultaneously
seek to do work and reflect on it, teach students and ask them to hold themselves open
to thinking about the process of learning the things we teach.
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cause of our commitment to stressing responsibility rather than power
(or duty, or rights), we have developed an unusually complex, open,
reflective (and some would say masochistic) governance mechanism.
In its simplest form, that mechanism calls for decision making to
take place in a series of committees. The broader community is en-
gaged in this process by means of an Assembly, which provides input
and which can review Committee decisions. But the Assembly is not a
decision-making body. It deliberates, but it cannot act except to send
specific decisions back to committee if the Assembly feels that they
require further work.
This system is, in many ways, quite simple. But it is also the area
of greatest controversy around the Law School, and it provides the fo-
rum for a range of feelings to be expressed about disenfranchisement,
power, constituency, representation, and role. It was consciously cre-
ated to come apart (by means of stalemate and the impossibility of
action) whenever the experience of community begins to falter. As a
result, it constantly feels on the brink of disaster. As we struggle to
negotiate the turbulent waters of conflicting values, we find it increas-
ingly difficult to trust each other with the decision-making power we all
have. Understanding how this can be involves a closer look at the ways
in which trust and responsibility are intertwined.
1. The Role of Trust
To the extent that the Law School manages to capture a special
commitment, expressed in part through a special working relationship,
that seems to me to be simultaneously important and fragile. It is im-
portant because it can make a difference in the way our students be-
come lawyers and the ways in which the faculty and staff live their
work lives. And it is important because other law schools looking at
what we do may be able to find ways to adapt parts of our own ap-
proach to their work.15 It is fragile because our commitment to shared
15. We have engaged in a rather comprehensive thinking through of all aspects
of our curriculum, and in this essay I have presented our work from the perspective of
our basic premises, a perspective that inevitably seems most global and intertwined.
But much of what we do may hold possibilities for places engaged in far less basic
revisions of their curriculum and may have instrumental value beyond the normative
values that I attribute to our program here. The Houses, for instance, remake the pro-
gram in a way that is really quite remarkable and impossible to catalogue, and all they
require is space (a tight commodity at many places). Our approach to simulations may
also be transferred in part even at schools that choose not to allocate resources in a way
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principles in a community that has i constantly changing membership
may be like building a sand castle during low tide. What we have done
so far to assure a law school that differs from the norm in ways that
are significant to us will be first eroded and then overwhelmed as each
wave of new people gets closer and closer.
As lawyers we share a belief in the healing power of process. If it
looks as though there is a danger ahead, we yearn to make a rule that
will exclude the threat we foresee. If the rule seems to permit some new
danger, or not fully to avoid the old one, we want to amend it, to get it
just right, so that the danger goes away. If we could just get the rule
right, everything would be right.
So we as lawyers want to try to devise governance structures for
the Law School that simultaneously welcome in each new horde of new
people and assure us that our principles will remain at the forefront of
what we do. These rules would be democratic, at least in the sense that
they would be open to revision once the new group arrives, but we
would hope that they would stick for at least a while. We want to com-
municate the sense that, in essence, since we have been entrusted with
the principles on which the institution is based, we, those of us who are
already here, should be trusted to implement those principles well.
Rules are important. We in fact need a governance structure
(though I dislike the word, for reasons that I will try to make clear).
But I also think that rules can bear three different sorts of relation to a
set of shared principles, and that which one of these relationships we
start with makes all the difference in the world.
In one, the one that I find tempting but treacherous, the rules are
created in the hope that they will persuade others of the importance
and beauty of the principles. The benefits to be had by adhering to the
rules will be manifest, and those who do will come to see the wisdom of
the rulemakers, acting in a sense as their trustees. If we can make the
rules eminently fair, if we can exercise the authority benevolently and
altruistically, then either those governed will recognize the rightness of
the principles on which the rules are founded, or they will be hopeless
ingrates who would have been still more dangerous if their animal
urges had been allowed to roam free.
I have problems with this way of doing things, because it just
doesn't seem to work. People seem to rebel against rules irrespective of
their content. Authority exercised invites resistance. Moreover, the as-
that would permit their full implementation.
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sumption that there is a single set of principles, which are generally to
be viewed as best by a wide range of well-intentioned people, seems
wildly counter-intuitive.
And so, a second possibility seems in order. How can we avoid this
resistance to even altruistic governance, except by opening the govern-
ance structure to all? How can anyone complain about a system that
has been put in place by the governed, about the collective exercise of
authority? Let us bring everyone in, set a tentative agenda of subjects
that need to be discussed, and create a governance structure together.
In all likelihood, the people already in the institution will not retain a
central role, but that is the price we must pay for participatory govern-
ment; perhaps even the principles we had thought so important will
turn out to fall short of consensus and other principles will be substi-
tuted in their place.
This, it seems to me, is even less satisfactory than the first ap-
proach. It requires setting aside our principles as just ours, open to
compromise or change by majority vote (or some such mechanism). It
means that, whatever our intuitions about what is important, we have
no right to say any more than, "This is important to me," not, "This is
important to the Law School." And if we really feel, as I do, that we
have begun something important but fragile, then subjugating our rea-
son for being to a participatory governance structure is just plain not
right.
These two approaches feel like the only alternatives, and it is frus-
trating to ricochet off one into the other and back again as we seek to
come up with a structure that captures our principles while welcoming
new colleagues and students. But the point is that they are not the only
two ways of doing things, and that it may be possible to transcend
them and the frustration they seem to entail.
These are, in fact, the two governance alternatives, the two ways
in which an institution can make claims on individual behavior. The
institution can be autocratic, some group can tell everyone else what to
do, or it can be democratic, in which everyone tells everyone what to
do. The conflict and potential for frustration in this dichotomy are evi-
dent as soon as it is played out in practice (as it is now for us at the
Law School). Because I don't want to have others tell me what to do
(as I am afraid they will do if a majority made up overwhelmingly of
students takes control), I prefer a system in which my friends get to tell
everyone else what to do. But that justification (the desire to avoid be-




This points the way to what I believe is the central issue: the ques-
tion of trust. The problem seems to be that what we all really want is a
system of trust, a system in which we each presuppose that each of us
merits all of our trust. And, desirable as that situation is, it is totally
counterintuitive. Not only do we have no reason to trust a bunch of
strangers, our experience tells us that these strangers, as newcomers
and students, will be in situations that will color their own experience,
that will make their involvement at least somewhat subjective, perhaps
even though their experience tells them that they are being objective
participants.
It is a problem, perhaps the problem, because basically what we
are saying to newcomers is that they should trust us, but what we are
also saying to them is that we don't trust them. And that is not a way
to engender trust in anyone but small children and some particularly
gullible domesticated animals.
The way that most of us work is that trust builds slowly, out of our
mutual observations of trustworthiness. This process, which is delicate
and beautiful and just about the best thing there is, is what friendship
and love are about. And the question is, how do we infuse our "govern-
ance" structure, immediately, with what is usually a slowly-won end
product - trust? It may be a problem without a solution. It is in many
ways the central problem with which we as lawyers must deal - why
should clients trust us? - and it is the focus of what much of our
teaching will inevitably be about.
The answer, if there is one, has to do with responsibility. People
who act responsibly are trustworthy, and according others responsibil-
ity is a way of making evident our trust in them.
This reveals why I don't like the word "governance:" Anything
that starts from "governance" - from trying to find a way to minimize
the risks inherent in working with other people 6 - closes us off, mod-
els a way of being with each other that is simultaneously less risky and
less fertile. Avoiding the risks requires that we forego the possibilities.
The alternative is to try maximizing the benefits inherent in work-
ing with people, to open outward, to take the risks and reap the oppor-
tunities. No one can guarantee that the outcome from this sort of
openeness will be better; in all likelihood it is as likely to be as much
worse as it is to be better. But it is infused with the possibility of wild,
boundless success, of dreams and aspirations, of becoming and of blos-
16. I try to get at the ways in which government and law are inherently distant
from morality in Farago, My Rights and Your Responsibilities, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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soming and of perpetually increasing energy. It is, of course, also in-
fused with the possibility of deep, bottomless failure, and great personal
pain. That is why it is hard to go this route, to walk the tightrope
without a safety net. And yet it seems to me that it is well worth doing
nevertheless. If we start by trying to manifest our own trust of each
influx of new students and colleagues, by trying to open ourselves to
shared responsibility and shared aspiration, we may find that the new,
expanded law school community includes the kind of relationship that
we had managed to achieve prior to their arrival.
~ I, : '
Breaking down student-faculty barriers
Here is the nub of what I am trying to say: I see these - maxi-
mizing our openness to each other and bringing new people into that
openness - as the two hardest "governance" tasks, and I think they
have to come in that order.
When I used to have a pet fox, I was always awed by his wildness.
That quality set him apart from other pets, gave him an independence
and an autonomy that seemed very special. But its primary characteris-
tic was an overreaching paranoia, an assumption that the world was
nothing but a collection of dangers, threats, and risks. He lost out on a
lot this way. He lost many human friends, people who were put off by
his snarling or his fear; he flinched too sharply and too quickly. He
seemed nervous constantly, and rarely at peace. His metabolism ran at
an incredible pace, and he could move from sleep (which always
seemed shallow) to vigilance and attack with a suddenness that as-
tounded me. He built trust, but slowly, and generally tentatively. He
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was always prepared to be betrayed even by his best friends.
The fox had a solid handle on the traditional governance models.
If we want to transcend these, we have to find a way, inside ourselves,
to open ourselves to each other and to the newcomers. We have to af-
firm ourselves in our work and in our structures. It becomes harder and
harder to do this as the institution grows, as the incumbents become
more defensive and the new people more wary. More than anything
else, this concern suggests to me that we must reach out to each other
in our work, striving harder as the task becomes more difficult. The
assumption we start from must differ from those of the fox. We have to
assume the best of each other, not the worst (and not some uncommit-
ted neutrality, biding time until we prove our desert to each other).
This does not mean that I am proposing a path of open democracy,
it does not mean that all members of the community should be identi-
cal in decision making. It does mean, though, that all members of the
community should start with a premise of openness to each other, from
an assumption that all of us are good people, working in good faith,
doing the best that we can. This may not always be true, and there are
costs to making that assumption, but over the long haul those costs are
far smaller than the costs of assuming the opposite.
2. Committee Membership
The tension between the desire to form a governance process that
respects a commitment to shared goals on the one hand and one that
respects openness and responsiveness on the other can only be resolved
by recourse to the notions of responsibility and trust. No formula will
balance these scales. Rather, if we can find a way to take some risks
and trust each other as we do so, we may be able to achieve something
remarkable. To me, this means that the Law School should be moving
toward a governance process in which decisions are made by people
who are willing to take responsibility for the work involved in making
those decisions. 17
17. I write prospectively because, as I put these words on paper, we are in the
process of reviewing a number of critical aspects of our governance plan, including how
committees should be constituted and how the Assembly should be composed. In all
likelihood, by the time this goes to press some of these questions will have been an-
swered; though I would predict that the answers will be subject to new criticisms, in
part because we seem to be thinking about the revision as a series-of amendments (a




This means to me that all committees should be open to anyone
who wants to serve on them. It also means that anyone serving on a
committee should be engaged in the committee's work, should respect
its process predating that person's joining that committee, and should
engage as a full participant in addressing the committee's agenda.
The basic premise is that the people who care about issues enough
to try to work out their solutions should be the ones on whom those
solutions depend. It is a process that, when it works, is openly inclusive
of the participation of all members of the community, while providing
significant guidance as to the way in which that participation must be
played out. It would require all members of the community to let go of
many issues because no one has the time to work on all of them. It
would require everyone to give deference to each other's work, while
allowing each person to be involved in the matters that concern her or
him most. It would involve trust in each other and faith in the process,
a faith based not in the hope that the process would work, but in the
belief that even if we fail to use this process as a way to govern our-
selves efficiently it nevertheless allows us and encourages us to treat
each other with the kind of care that each of us deserves.
The important thing is that this sort of incredibly demanding and
deeply counterintuitive way of dealing with each other - a presupposi-
tion of trust rather than distrust, of openness rather than wariness - is
not in itself the answer. It is, if anything, a prerequisite to any sus-
taining answer, and yet its very openness may well inevitably doom it
to no more than short-term viability. It is a commitment that must be
repeatedly, almost constantly, renewed and it is a task that is so diffi-
cult that it is hard to conceive of a community capable of renewing the
commitment over and over again.
As a result, I do not put these premises out because I think they
will work in the sense that I think they will create a state of perfect
harmony, or even of mutual respect. I put them out because they are
the only ones on which I can imagine founding a community I deem to
be justifiable in principle (rather than out of necessity). It may be that
necessity will drive us to depart from these principles if an institution is
to survive in the long haul. The importance of that survival, however, is
directly connected to the viability of these principles. When one lets go
of principle, survival changes from a question of mission to one of job
security. So I think it is worth continuing to try to do it the hard way.
And, on balance, it is also possible that doing it the hard way may yield
wonderful results. The possibility of those results, and the importance
of the attempt in and of itself, should be sufficient motivation to make
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the experiment worth trying.
3. The Decision-Making Process
It is virtually implicit in the notion that the committees should be
open to everyone that participation in decision making should be based
on good faith participation in deliberation and that the decisions them-
selves should be based on a process typified by consensus. Consensus
captures, indeed embodies, the duality of the tension that lies at the
heart of this aspiration. It requires each person to listen to and embrace
the views of every other person, even as it imposes on each person the
responsibility to express his or her own feelings with care, precision,
and sensitivity. The potential for stalemate is overwhelming; the poten-
tial for success fragile. It is precisely this potential for stalemate that
provides a gentle (though at times wildly frustrating) channeling of col-
lective energy towards mutual respect and away from individualistic
demands.
It is self-evident, but nevertheless worth noting, that there are twin
risks in opening the decision-making process to anyone who cares about
the issue being decided. On the one hand, some issues will draw an
overwhelming amount of participation. On the other, many more issues
will draw too little energy to see them through to conclusion. It would
be simple to say that we must discipline ourselves each to take a part of
the less exciting work. And it would be true. But I doubt that it would
be sufficient. It would be equally simple to suggest that the process is in
many ways self-disciplining. Sooner or later work that is avoided be-
comes an important issue to some people. On the other hand, the cum-
bersomeness of the process of deciding through consensus difficult and
controversial decisions will by itself tend to limit people's participation
in some of the more electric issues as time passes.
But these are only partial answers. A central aspect of the process
I am discussing involves recognizing that although the process is
equally open to everyone, we do not all have an equal claim on it. Some
people have work within the institution that involves taking responsibil-
ity for specific areas of choice. Thus, for example, I don't mean to sug-
gest that the librarian could decide that library matters were less en-
gaging than other ones and that he or she should therefore be free to
allocate time to those areas that were more interesting at the expense
of library priorities.
This same sort of thing is true for everyone with respect to the
areas in which they work. It is an important and a significant con-
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straint that inevitably will have an extensive impact on the way in
which this sort of process plays itself out.
Similarly, people who have been working on an area of concern for
some time, and therefore have both history and experience in that area,
should be accorded a significant measure of deference by people who
newly leap into an issue. Similarly again, people who care strongly
about an issue inevitably should be accorded deference and concern
proportionate to the strength of their feelings. And, finally, people
whose lives will be affected by a decision should also be accorded a
deference that recognizes the impact the decisions will have on their
lives. All of these will act as contraints and filters in the decision-mak-
ing process.
The decisions at the Law School should be primarily carried on in
committees because that best expresses the principles that decisions
should be decentralized and rooted in the people who care about the
choices. A further reflection of this, and a natural, nonrepresentational
basis for constituting the Assembly, would suggest that that body be
composed of all the members of the standing committees.
An Assembly made up of committee members would reflect the
notion that the Assembly is not a decision-making body and the com-
mittees are where decisions are made and actions taken. Furthermore,
it would be an Assembly made up entirely of people familiar with the
governance process. Finally, everyone in the Assembly would have the
twin experience of being both a committee member (and therefore sen-
sitive to the deference that each committee would wish its actions to be
granted by the Assembly) and an Assembly member (and therefore
sensitive to the accountability and accessibility issues that the Assem-
bly would want them to bear in mind as they did their work on their
committees).
4. The Role of Students
I stress again my discomfort with the word "governance." I am
talking about the formation of community and the relation between in-
dividual commitment and collective action. Taken together, these may
have some relationship to notions that we might call "self-governance"
but even that term seems somehow internally contradictory. We are not
trying to "govern" ourselves, rein ourselves in, but rather to join to-
gether and in so doing achieve more, not less, than we could as individ-
uals. The attempt to do this, to structure community, can have a very
special role in a law school. Law is after all simply the larger society's
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approach to the issues we are trying to deal with here.
Political theory is seldom dealt with in law schools as an important
part of the curriculum. That is, I have already suggested that most
schools accept a premise of pragmatism, viewing law as a natural arti-
fact, something to be studied, the subject of our science. It is not
thought to be the creation of those who work within the legal system or
the result of a series of choices made among alternatives. Because we
want to take the opposite approach here at CUNY, we have a very
special opportunity to use our own process as a basis for a new, phe-
nomenologically-based political theory. Our governance process can be
a laboratory in which we experiment with and learn about the nature
(and perhaps the inevitable weaknesses) of the attempt to use rules and
structures to pattern communities.
There are, therefore, two distinct reasons why the mechanism of
our community should be perpetually in a process of re-creation, at
least in some ways. First, I have been trying to describe a governance
process that requires not merely the consent of the governed but their
active affirmation of, and participation in, the collective decision-mak-
ing process. Second, nothing provides so clear a window on rules, rule-
making, and their relation to community as does the process of their
formation.
These concerns are addressed in part at the Law School, and con-
sciously so, in the Houses as each new entering class is split into work
groups and each of these groups seeks to find its own identity and its
government. That newness can be extended more broadly into the stu-
dent government process, allowing each new class to fashion its own
mechanism for participating in school-wide governance issues. Each
new cohort could be accorded the remarkable opportunity to recreate
the institution as some of us have had the chance to participate in its
creation. Each class can be the first class, and can partake of the very
special rewards and trials associated with starting from scratch.
Conclusion
These ideas proceed from the notion that we are trying to devise a
system in which we are led to trust each other even when trust seems
least intuitively to be in order. People with power would have to relin-
quish it; people who have been at the Law School a comparatively long
time would be asked to accord newcomers a significant role in decision
making; newcomers with strong feelings about how things should be
would be asked to yield with respect to those feelings until they had the
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time to immerse themselves in the decision-making process; all of us
would depend on each other to act responsibly with respect to the tasks
we take on, the work we commit to do, and the way in which we utilize
the fragile and powerful instrument of withholding consensus.
I want to close by stressing a point I made relatively early on. The
reason to do what we are doing, to reinvest the doctrinal curriculum
with a spirit drawn from the twin premises of trust and responsibility,
to embrace the House system and to struggle with the formation of
community, is not the belief that any of this will "work," that it will
somehow efficiently (or even sloppily) build a successful law school.
Rather, my premise is that we should go in this direction because it is
right, because it is the way pointed to by our shared sense of what we
are trying to do. So if what we want is to build a law school that em-
bodies certain principles, we will surely fail if our internal structures
don't themselves reject those principles. But merely avoiding the neces-
sity of failure is not a guarantee of success.
This has two corollaries. First, making these choices has not been,
and probably will not become, easy. That is, they will not be validated
by divine revelation or fantastic success; we probably won't win the
educational lottery, we will probably still have to work hard to avoid
disaster. All we do as we make these choices is pick which of several
hard paths we will walk.
The second corollary is that we cannot assess the rightness of our
choices by the success of our venture. If things go wrong, that does not
mean that we should rethink our decision, and if they go well we should
pause an eternity before becoming smug. We make the choices we have
made because we wanted to, not because it makes our lives easier or
assures the success of the Law School.
We are led in this direction, then, not by the certainty of success,
but by its possibility. The premises of trust and responsibility are not
rich, but fertile. Like all things worth caring about, they involve risk.
And the other side of risk is opportunity.
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